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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyse individual vocational rehabilitation clients’ decisions to enter
active training or not. Although the Government pays the direct costs of training, the
composition of the total costs of training may be decisive for individual choices. Based
on labour market theory, we relate background characteristics of the clients to monetary
opportunity costs and non-monetary costs of training, arguing that training choices are a
consequence of differences in costs of training. We use a ten percent sample of
participants in educational programs, work related training and non-participants who
entered the Norwegian vocational rehabilitation sector in the period from 1989 to 1993,
a total of 6653 persons. We find that the background characteristics of persons investing
in educational training differ along several dimensions compared both to persons
attending work related training and to clients not participating in training at all.
Keywords:public policy, private incentives, costs of training, educational training, work
related training, vocational rehabilitation
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Conditions like ill health and/or mismatch of individuals’ skills and the requirements in
the labour market can for some lead to a permanent withdrawal from the labour market.
For instance, people with ill health - making them unable to perform their traditional
craft or to perform according to employers’ expectations - may end up as long term
unemployed and finally, with a disability pension. However, unemployed may still have
a chance to find employment by acquiring new skills in accordance with their health
condition and the demand for skilled workers in the labour market. Governmental
interventions in the areas of post-schooling employment schemes and training programs
may be means of achieving this. Such governmental interventions are permanent
fixtures of most OECD countries and the interventions normally have two basic goals:
to reduce unemployment and poverty by increasing skills of certain groups of the
population. Both objectives require that the schemes or programs increase the
probability of employment and/or increase the earnings of the participants above what
they would otherwise achieve.
An almost generic Governmental view is that the main purpose of offering educational
and work related training programs to partly disabled or hard to employ workers is to
enhance the participants’ human capital and productive skills, increase individual
employment prospects and, in turn, reduce transition to disability pension. However,
from a client’s point of view participation or non-participation in a training program
may be the result of a more complex decision making process influenced by intrinsic,
and, for the Government (and researcher), unobservable characteristics of the individual
client.
1 Although there are observable costs, such as training fees, other cost
components, such as disutility of effort, are not observable (directly at least). Thus,
public policy in the area of manpower training confronts private incentives partly driven
by factors not observable by policy makers, program administrators or researchers.
                                                          
1 The caseworker’s opinion of a client’s need of training may have an impact on the choice made by a
client. Furthermore, a client may be rationed in the sense that the most preferred training program is not3
There is a huge literature devoted to estimating the effect of training programs (e.g.
Ashenfelter (1978), Bassi (1984) and Heckman, Hotz and Dabos (1987)) and to
analysing the particular econometric issues involved when estimating such effects (e.g.
Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman and Hotz (1989), Moffitt (1991) and Heckman
and Smith (1996)). For a discussion of a Norwegian VR program see Aakvik (2001).
The topic of sample selection and the deleterious effects on the properties of
conventional estimators such as least squares has been at the core of much of the recent
work. The basic problem is that selection bias arises when a non-random selection
process determines participation in training programs. Researchers do not observe all
explanatory variables influencing program participation and outcome.
Selection bias is of course not only an econometric issue. The ambition of
Governmental programs is to ‘hit the right people’, an ambition usually stated quite
explicitly. The selection bias may be a ‘real life problem’ if the Government allocates
scarce resources mainly to program participants who without a training program would
do as well in the labour market as with such training. Thus, when evaluating the impact
of training programs on earnings or on the probability of getting employed one should
take into account the fact that the impact might be correlated with variables determining
participation in the first place.
The importance of unobservable characteristics of a client becomes particularly evident
when noting that skill formation can be acquired in a variety of situations with different
levels of training costs for an individual. Generally, participants in training programs
incur three types of costs and the composition of cost components can affect the training
decisions taken by the individuals. Firstly, participants usually have to pay a tuition fee
to participate in a training program. Sometimes the employer or a third party, like local
or central Government, pays this direct cost. Secondly, it is often assumed that
participation in a training program gives rise to non-monetary costs (NMC) or disutility
                                                                                                                                                                         
available. We have neither information allowing us to measure caseworkers’ impact on the choices made
by clients nor the degree of rationing.4
of training born by the individual. Thirdly, the clients incur monetary opportunity costs
(MOC) in terms of lost income while attending training.
2
It is the complex decision making process at individual level we find interesting, an
issue that most often is treated implicitly in the evaluation literature. By shifting focus
from estimating mean effects of training to modelling and testing an individual’s
decision to participate, we take one step back in the decision making process compared
to much of the evaluation literature. Basically, our main aim is to study the selection
process itself. We analyse whether clients participating in active training separate
themselves from non-participants and whether clients participating in general and
specific training programs separate themselves from each other in terms of background
characteristics.
Our approach is to use the background characteristics as indicators of an individual’s
cost of training and thereby his or her incentives to participate. Our main hypothesis is
that differences in training costs are decisive in forming the individual’s incentive to
participate in training or not. Heterogeneity in innate abilities of an individual and/or the
particular welfare benefits the client is eligible to receive, are among the important
variables that influence costs of training. Specifically, based on human capital and
signalling theory,
3 we relate differences in previous education and age to differences in
non-monetary costs (NMC) of training. Differences in previous income and status as
recipient of VR benefits give raise to differences in monetary opportunity costs (MOC)
of training. Spouse’s income may also give rise to differences in the cost of training.
                                                          
2 See for instance Elliott (1991) for a discussion of private costs of human capital investment.
3 The main difference between human capital and signalling interpretations of training is that signalling
models allow for attributes that are not observed by the firm to be correlated with training. According to
Weiss (1995) sorting models (signalling and screening models) of education (training) can best be viewed
as extensions of human capital models. Sorting models extend human capital theory models by allowing
for some productivity differences that firms do not observe to be correlated with the costs or benefits of
schooling. In fact, Weiss argues that sorting models subsume all the features of human capital models.
However, while human capital theory is concerned with determining the return to schooling, sorting
models, while allowing for learning, focus on the ways in which schooling serves as either a signal or filter
for productivity differences that firms cannot reward directly.5
The data consist of a random 10 percent sample of persons who entered the Norwegian
vocational rehabilitation sector in the period from 1989 to 1993, a total of 6653
persons.
4 We find that the background characteristics of persons investing in educational
training differ along several dimensions compared both to persons in work related
training and to VR clients not participating in any training. Firstly, participants in
educational training programs have background characteristics that indicate
comparatively low NMC (disutility of effort) of participating in training programs.
Secondly, they also have background characteristics that indicate comparatively low
MOC. Persons attending work related training have background characteristics
indicating both higher NMC and higher MOC compared to participants in educational
training. Non-participants have background characteristics indicating relatively high
NMC of training compared to both of the other groups of clients.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we present some important features of
the Norwegian VR sector. In section 3 we model an individual’s decision-making
process, make a closer distinction between different cost components of training and
discuss the incentives to train. The data used in the analysis are presented in section 4
along with descriptive statistics. Our main findings are presented in section 5 while
conclusions and policy implications are drawn in section 6.
2.  INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE VR SECTOR
Public concern about the level of investment in human capital among the unemployed
and those outside the labour market is quite evident in OECD (1998). The report gives a
description of the importance of OECD Governments attributing to the strategic role of
human capital investments. Based on an international adult literacy survey, the report
                                                                                                                                                                         
4 VR clients participating in educational training are usually integrated into ordinary classes in the public
school system, or attend classroom training aimed specifically at unemployed people. The purpose of
these programs is to enhance an individual’s human capital in a way that is compatible with demands from
a relatively large number of different types of jobs, i.e. general training. Work related training usually
includes one or more of the following: employment in the public sector, wage subsidies, physical
rehabilitation, sheltered work, and vocational training in specific occupational skills sometimes leading up
to a vocational certificate. Work related training programs are often targeted at enhancing individual skills
in a more narrow range of jobs, i.e. specific training.6
concludes that job-related training by employed people constitutes a high proportion of
all adult education and training activity. On average, people who are not employed are
less likely to participate in job-related training. Those outside the labour market are
more likely than employed people to participate in education and training unrelated to
work. Also, participation in continuing training is strongly related to educational
attainment. Those with less initial human capital appear to lack incentives or
opportunities to acquire more later in life, creating the risk of exclusion. This is true for
all countries in the study.
5 It is notable that the differences in participation rates between
countries are as great as differences between well and poorly educated groups within
countries. See also Chapman (1993) for a comprehensive discussion of different aspects
of training: theory, empirical evidence and policy issues.
In Norway, concern about the gap in education between partly disabled and non-
disabled workers has resulted in comprehensive use of educational programs of a
general character. Education in the ordinary school system is the most widely used VR
program aimed at partly disabled workers in Norway. Also, the VR sector offers
different work related training programs to enhance specific skills.
 6 
7
The Norwegian vocational rehabilitation sector has expanded rapidly since the national
social insurance act was passed in 1966. The number of participants in training
programs has stabilised during the 1990s. There are around 35,000 persons in different
VR programs each day, which is around 1.5 percent of the labour force in Norway. The
expansion has neither been guided by a firm knowledge of the overall economic impact
of the training programs, nor by knowledge of who selects the different training
                                                          
5 Norway is not among the countries covered by the survey. Our study will be a contribution to analyzing
whether the selection mechanism found elsewhere in Europe is replicated for Norway. See also OECD
(1996) for a review of problems associated with assessing and certifying occupational skills in vocational
education and training.
6 There is a gap of general and specific skills between partly disabled and both unemployed and employed
non-disabled workers in Norway. Less than 70 percent of the vocational rehabilitation (VR) clients in
Norway have high school or more, while the same number is 75 percent for ordinary unemployed. In the
labor force around 85 percent have high school or more. Furthermore, Hansen (1996) finds that VR
clients have less work experience and are less likely to hold a vocational certificate compared to non-
disabled workers.
7 Note that job search assistance is not considered training. Such assistance is open for everyone at local
labor market agencies at no direct cost to the user.7
programs. Given the amount of public funds channelled into these areas of public policy
and the ultimate goals of the spending, this may seem at odds with the present focus on
accountability in the public sector.
The VR sector offers income maintenance payments (VR benefits) and training
programs for individuals with reduced productivity in the labour market due to medical
conditions. The decision to offer VR benefits is made by the local Social Security
Office, usually after a recommendation by a medical doctor.
8 The rehabilitation benefit
is usually two-thirds of the gross income from the previous year subject to maximum
and minimum benefit restrictions. Health status is the legal eligibility criterion for VR
benefit, but labour market prospects and social integration may also implicitly be taken
into account by the local Social Security Office or the medical doctor. There is no
maximum number of weeks a client may receive vocational rehabilitation benefit but
normally periods do not exceed 3-4 years.
While receiving VR benefit some people return to their old job or apply for a disability
pension without entering the training sector. The worst cases in terms of medical
diagnoses are usually granted a disability pension. Individuals who are not granted a
disability pension or by their own effort return to a job, are referred to the local
Employment Office where they can apply for participation in a training program. All
schooling and labour market training is free – no fees are paid by the participants - and
extra expenses, such as commuting, are covered by the Social Security Office.
Participants without VR benefits usually rely on social assistance. Also, a smaller group
is accepted for disability pensions prior to going into a training program, but these
persons are not 100 percent disabled, and are thus at least able to take part-time jobs.
The process at the local Employment office starts with a conversation between a VR
caseworker and the client. The consultant asks about the interests and potential
                                                                                                                                                                         
8 Some institutional changes have been made in VR responsibilities in Norway. As from 1994, the labour
market authorities decide on both rehabilitation benefit payments and program participation. These
changes do not apply for our data.8
occupations, and the severity of medical conditions. The candidates for program
participation supply information to the program administrator about personal
preferences, motivation, ability, etc. The caseworker and the client usually decide on a
rehabilitation plan. The caseworker guides the client if necessary but the interests of the
client is always of main focus for the caseworker. Available training slots in areas where
the applicant has shown interest may affect the final result of the selection process into a
training program. The client may also decide not to participate in training.
There may be a time lag between the creation of a rehabilitation plan and the start of
new training programs. During this period individuals may choose to drop out due to
lack of motivation or acceptance of a disability pension. It may also be the case that
some individuals receive and accept a job offer prior to the start of a training program
and thus drop out. We do not directly observe who is offered a training slot but for some
reason does not attend training. We only observe if a person attends training or not. If a
person attends training we observe in the data the specific type of training they take.
3. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
We assume that VR clients are bounded rational, i.e. they cannot possibly foresee all the
things that might matter for the decision to participate or not. Given that they do not
have perfect foresight, clients have to make decisions to participate in training or not
based on less than perfect information. While the effects on income from training
choices are influenced by a range of exogenous factors (e.g. the future conditions in the
labour market, how well others do in the courses etc.), costs of training are to be born
nearer in time and are basically intrinsic to the individual. Thus, it is more difficult for
an individual client to sort choices according to expected training effects on income than
to sort according to cost levels. Clients are myopic.
Ex ante, i.e. before a client has made the choice, a client’s utility of a particular training
choice can be represented by the utility function  ji ji ji C I U − = .  ji I  is expected income,
i.e. income after having participated in a training program or, as the case may be, from9
not participating in a training program at all.  ji C  is a vector representing training costs
for individual i choosing alternative j. Training costs are zero if the individual does not
participate. Expected income is based on a probability distribution of finding work and
knowledge of the distribution of the wage level(s) in jobs foreseen as being available to
an individual ex ante. We assume that clients do not act on the differences in expected
income but make their choices based on a ranking of costs associated with the different
options available. Important for formulating the econometric model to be tested here is
that we cannot observe a client’s expected income level but we do observe indicators of
the costs associated with training. We return to this shortly.
The difference in utility between state j and state k then becomes
ji ki ki ji C C U U − = −
Let  ji U  be individual i’s utility from choosing alternative yi = 1 and  i U0  be individual
i’s utility from choosing alternative yi = 0. We have that
9
(1)  ) Pr( ) 1 Pr( 0 1 i i i i U U y P > = = =
An individual’s utility from the alternatives available to him/her has both a deterministic
and a stochastic component. Using the case of two alternatives (participation, non-
participation) as an example,
i i i U U 1 1 1 ε + =
°
i i i U U 0 0 0 ε + =
°
                                                          
9 We model the decision making process as a utility maximizing process and base our model on
McFadden (1973, 1976, 1978) and Domencich and McFadden (1975). McFadden’s provision of a




i U1  and 
°
i U0  are deterministic components and  i 1 ε  and  i 0 ε  are stochastic for
participation and non-participation respectively.
Further specification of 
°
ji U  is necessary. Let us initially divide the covariates into two
groups. Let  ji W  include variables that characterise the choices in question and let  i Z
include variables that characterise the individual. We then have
1 1 1 γ δ i i i Z W U ′ + ′ =
°
0 0 0 γ δ i i i Z W U ′ + ′ =
°
We can now write the ith individual’s probability of choosing alternative yi = 1 as a
function of the net benefit of choosing participation versus non/participation:
(2)  ) Pr( ) Pr( ) 1 Pr( 0 1 1 0 0 1
° ° − < − = > = = i i i i i i i U U U U y ε ε
Let  β γ γ δ i i i i i i X Z W W U U ′ = − ′ + ′ − ′ = −
° ° ) ( ) ( 0 1 0 1 0 1 , where  ] , ) [( 0 1 i i i i Z W W X ′ ′ − = ′  and
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δ
. We can now write
(3)  ) Pr( ) Pr( ) Pr( ) 1 Pr( 1 0 0 1 β ε β ε ε i i i i i i i i X X U U y ′ < = ′ < − = > = =
°
or
(4) ) ( ) 1 Pr( β i i X F y ′ = =
where ) ( β i X F ′  is the cumulative distribution of 
°
i ε  evaluated at  β i X′ . McFadden
(1973) has shown that if each  ki ε  (k = 0,1) is independent and identical type I extreme
value distributed, then the distribution of the difference 
° = − i i i ε ε ε 1 0  will be logistic,
and the choice probabilities can be expressed by the multinomial logit.11
According to the multinomial logit model, individual i will choose alternative j among J
alternatives with probability (normalising by setting  0 0 = γ )
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We estimate and report the marginal effects specifically and they are given by the
expression (for variable Zik):









= Σ − =
∂
∂
Turning to the more specific issues of this study, note that a VR client faces three
choices: non-participation, educational training programs and work related training
programs. The aim is to develop the reduced form estimation model linking, as briefly
discussed above, background characteristics of the individual and training costs. We
then go on linking the cost components to the probabilities of entering the three different
states of ‘non-participation’, ‘educational training’ or ‘work related training’.
In our reduced form maximum likelihood estimation, it is the background characteristics
of the individuals that are used as explanatory variables, not the cost components. The
cost components are not observable for the researcher, and measurements would under
any circumstances be difficult to perform. Still, we assume that it is possible to make
ordinal rankings within each cost component. We do this by stating the sign of partial
derivatives of the cost functions, i.e. the direction of change in costs to changes in
background characteristics. These effects are then used to state the expected sign of the
probabilities of entering the different states as response to changes in the background
characteristics, i.e. the expected sign of the marginal effects given by equation (6).12
The Government pays the direct costs of training
10 but a client participating in training
incurs other types of costs, too. In particular, there are two other basic cost components
that may matter for the choices that the individuals are making: the non-monetary costs
of training (CN) and the monetary opportunity costs of training (CM). Human capital
investment theory and signalling theory inspired the division between non-monetary and
monetary costs. The division allows a closer study of the driving forces behind the
choices made by clients since we allow the composition and ‘size’ of the cost
components to vary among clients.
Let total VR costs be represented by the cost function C = f(CN, CM). The non-monetary
costs of training (NMC) can be thought of as disutility or psychological costs. These are
costs experienced by all individuals participating in training but the cost varies
depending on how difficult one finds learning to be. Here NMC is represented by the
function
CN  = g[EDU, AGE]
   -   +
Both education and age are commonly used as variables explaining differences in non-
monetary costs of training and the signs of the partial derivatives are in line with
assumptions made in signalling theory. The lower the former education level is and the
higher is the age, the higher is the level of anguish and anxiety associated with
participation.
According to job-market signalling theory,
11 training is correlated with differences
among workers that were present before training choices were made. An important
unobservable ability correlated with training is the individual’s capability of adapting to
new requirements at the work place. Firms may make inferences about productivity
                                                          
10 In the Norwegian VR system clients can make their choices under a regime of no direct financial
constraints i.e. the tuition fee is paid for by the Government. Direct training costs are therefore less
relevant here.
11 Spence’s (1973,1974) analysis rests on the assumption that persons of low-ability find signalling
through training more costly than do high-ability persons. More precisely, the marginal non-monetary cost13
differences from training choices, and the clients respond to this inference process by
choosing different levels of training or different courses. One of the main hypotheses in
signalling theory is that persons with low non-monetary costs of training or low
disutility of effort are inclined to signal high productive ability by choosing or self-
selecting to participate in training. The argument rests on a negative correlation between
productive ability and size of the non-monetary costs of training, i.e. the higher the
productive ability the lower the disutility of effort and vice versa.
Thus, here we assume that a client who has a relatively high educational level before
entering VR is assumed to have a comparatively low disutility of education due to the
fact that he or she has already completed educational programs in the past. In contrast,
the older one gets the more costly it is to participate in terms of disutility.
On the other hand, in the standard human capital model training is treated as an
investment decision
12 where the costs of training also consist of the monetary
opportunity costs. Monetary opportunity costs take the form of foregone market
opportunities. Time devoted to investment in human capital precludes the possibility of
devoting that time to other market or non-market activities. Here, the monetary
opportunity costs (MOC) of both types of training - work related or educational - is
given by
CM = h[INCOME, SPOUSEINC, VRBEN]
                  +                 -                     -
We assume that the individuals still perceive former income as a benchmark of their
worth in the labour market. Thus, foregone market opportunities or monetary
opportunity costs increases with higher former income level. On the other hand, we
assume that the costs of training decrease as spousal income increases, i.e. the
household subsidises the training costs for the individual. In other words, married or
                                                                                                                                                                         
or disutility) of education and work specific training is higher for low-ability than for high-ability persons
for every level of training (Gibbons (1992)).14
cohabiting persons participating in training can partly live on their partner's income
while undergoing training. An agreement can be made between partners that allows the
trainee to use more of the household's income while in training or that the household
agrees to reduce the consumption level in the training period. In the latter case, the
reduction in consumption implicitly represents a cost. We assume that higher spousal
income indicates less need to reduce consumption compared to a person with a lower
spouse income. Thus, the higher spouse income, the higher is the potential drive
towards training. Finally, in Norway clients may receive VR benefit (dummy variable in
the regression) while undergoing training. We assume that the opportunity costs
decrease if the client is a recipient of VR benefits.
13
The ‘priors’ on the likely estimates of participation in either of the programs are given
by the following partial derivatives (non-participation is given by opposite signs)
(7) ∂ Prob(yi=1)/∂ CM(.) < 0 and ∂ Prob(yi=1)/∂ CN < 0









































To sum up, our research strategy is not to estimate directly the different cost
components’ impact on the probability of participating in training or not
14 since direct
measurement of cost is difficult to achieve. Rather we use indicators and let them enter a
                                                                                                                                                                         
12 See Becker (1962,1964). Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and Barron, Berger and Black (1999) are two
recent contributions in the ‘Becker tradition’. Also see Elliott (1991) for a text book presentation of
human capital theory.
13 It is possible to receive different types of financial support while participating in training but VR
benefits (based on former income) represents normally the highest level of support available. For some
work related training programs, in particular training at so called Labor Market Enterprises, it is possible
to receive wages instead of VR benefits but that happens only later in the training process, i.e. at least six
months after first enrolling in active training.
14  In the case of participation: the probabilities of choosing general or specific training.15
reduced form equation. In the reduced form estimation we allow the effects of changes
in the background variables to influence the probability of participation directly, i.e. we
estimate the marginal effects of changes in the variables on the probability of entering
the different states.
 15
If participation or non-participation is completely random, there is no reason to expect
results as predicted by the model. We hypothesise that the process contains systematic
components and expect to find the following results:
1.  Other things equal, younger and more educated clients are more likely to participate
in active training programs, since they have comparatively low NMC. Vice versa for
older and less educated clients.
2.  Other things equal, clients with comparatively low previous income, high spouse
income and being recipients of VR benefits are more likely to participate in active
training, since they have comparatively low MOC. Vice versa for clients with
comparatively high previous income, low spouse income and non-recipients of VR
benefits.
3.  Clients participating in active training differ systematically in terms of background
characteristics and the composition of cost components, compared to non-
participants.
4.  Other things equal, clients with comparatively low NMC are more likely to
participate in educational training programs than in work related training.
Point 3 is our main hypothesis and builds on points 1 and 2. Point 4 requires more
discussion since it does not follow directly from (8) and (9).
Why should participants in educational training differ from participants in work related
training? Spence’s (1973, 1974) work on job-market signalling builds on the assumption
that less productive or less able individuals have higher disutilty of educational training
                                                          
15  See Table 1 in the appendix for an overview of the total set of variables used in the empirical analysis.16
compared to more productive individuals. Thus, other things equal, using education as a
signal of productive ability is more costly for the less productive. This implies that those
clients with relatively high disutility of effort, other things equal (in particular equal
MOC), are discouraged from participating in educational training programs. Obviously,
discouraged clients have two other options. One of the options is to participate in work
related training. Work related training is a more direct way of communicating
information about productive ability compared to educational training. The individuals
reveal information about their abilities since they are typically trained within a firm
where their productivity is observed as opposed to indirect revelation (or signalling)
through participation in educational programs. Loh (1994) analyses employment
probation as a screening mechanism
16 and finds that probation induces self-selection.
Those who accept jobs with probationary employment tend to be more efficient workers
and less likely to quit than those who take jobs without probation. Building on Loh,
work related training could function as a screening mechanism to discourage the least
qualified VR clients from participating in work related training. And since signalling
through educational training is also more costly for these clients, they will be more
likely not to participate in active training at all.
Still, we cannot a priori rule out that clients with the comparatively lowest NMC, i.e. the
clients with lowest disutility of effort and according to Spence the more able ones, may
pool with other types of clients in work related training. After all, they have the least to
fear from being directly observed at the work place. Pooling of types is also possible in
the educational training programs given that the less productive clients may have
incentives to ‘hide’ as more productive clients, a point also discussed by Spence.
Lastly, as Lang (1994) points out, the distinguishing characteristic of a sorting model is
that knowing an individual’s education provides employers with information about that
                                                                                                                                                                         
16 Loh (1994) terms probation a sorting mechanism. We prefer to use sorting as a common term for both
screening and signalling. Screening is the case where the uninformed party or the principal, designs and
offers a contract to the agent before the agent takes any action. Signalling is the case where the agent
chooses his/her action before the principal offers a contact (see e.g. Hillier (1997)).17
individual’s productivity which would be unknown otherwise. In human-capital models,
education is not informative, because employers observe productivity directly. Thus, the
models are distinguished by the role of education in conveying the individual’s private
information about his productivity. However, in both models units of human capital will
be generated in the same way from inputs of innate ability and schooling/training.
All in all, we expect to find that the choices made follow a ‘hierarchical structure’:
•   Individuals with comparatively low NMC will be more likely to choose educational
training than work related training, other things equal.
•   Individuals who are not discouraged from participating in active training but with
comparatively high NMC will choose work related training, other things equal.
•   Individuals who feel discouraged from participating in work related training due to
possible revelation of low productive abilities and with comparatively high NMC of
training will not participate in active training at all, other things equal.
Lastly, in the regressions we also use information on other background variables such as
medical diagnosis, disability status, whether the client receives social benefits and
whether the client was employed the year before entering the VR system.
4. DATA
Our data consist of people who were directed to the local labour market authorities for
participation in a training program during the period 1989 to 1993. We have relatively
detailed information on socioeconomic background characteristics, labour market
participation, and health status for the persons in our sample. We observe gender, age,
number of children below 18 years of age, education measured in years and type of
education, own income before entering the VR system, spouse’s income, work
experience in years, medical diagnosis, and several social security and labour market
states, such as training status, vocational rehabilitation benefit and social security
benefits. All of these variables change over time, except gender.18
Table 2 of the appendix shows that mean age is lowest for participants in educational
training. The gender variable shows that of the 1065 participants participating in
educational training most are women (approximately 52 percent). The opposite is true
both for work related training and for non-participation (approximately 61 percent out of
3927 cases and 54 percent out of 1661 cases are men). Approximately 70 percent of the
participants in educational training have high school or longer education, while the
numbers are down to approximately 60 percent for participants in work related training
and 53 percent for non-participants. The share of clients with college or university
education is also higher for the educational group.
While only approximately 18 percent of the participants in educational training had
received social benefits, the share is 31 percent for work related training and 24 percent
for non-participants. The share of clients with disability status is 31 percent in the non-
participation group compared to 17.5 percent in the work related and 8 percent in the
educational group.
Former income level is on average higher for the educational group and the same is the
case for the share of the clients receiving VR benefits. Number of years of working
experience is highest for non-participants (approximately 12 years), while work related
training and educational training average 10 and 8 years, respectively. The average level
of spouse’s income is highest for non-participants.
5.  RESULTS
Several individual characteristics appear to have an impact on the choice of whether to
participate in active rehabilitation or not, and in case of participation, in which type of
program to participate. The results from the multinomial logit model, reported as
marginal effects, are given in Table 3 of the appendix. We start out the discussion of the
result focusing on the central variables AGE, EDU, INCOME, SPOUSEINC and
VRBEN. For an explanation of these variables see Table 1.19
Table 3 shows that the clients’ age appears to increase the probability of not
participating in active training. For those clients that do participate, the older a client is,
the more likely it is that he or she will participate in work related training and the less
likely the client chooses educational training. The signs of the effects align well with the
discussion in section 3. The non-monetary cost of training is assumed to increase with
age, reducing the (partial) probability of participation, as the data confirm. Explaining
the distinction between those that participate in educational training and work related
training involves a more subtle argument. For clients participating in work related
training, it must be that the non-monetary costs (or disutility of effort) of educational
training is higher for every time or effort ‘unit’
17 compared to participation in work
related training. As age increases, the non-monetary costs of educational training
increase relatively more compared to work related training. Thus, the probability of
choosing educational training decreases with age.
Former education, the second variable influencing the non-monetary costs of training,
also ‘behaves’ nicely but with fewer significant results compared to the age variable.
Clients with only secondary school are more likely not to train compared to clients with
high school education. Table 3 in the appendix show that compared to those clients with
only secondary school (or less), high school education reduces the probability of non-
participation. For clients with college education there is no significant difference
compared to clients with only secondary school, though.
The results are in line with what we predicted in section 3. Higher education reduces the
non-monetary costs of training and increases the probability of participation. We also
find that college education reduces the probability of choosing work related training,
while increasing the probability of choosing educational training programs. High school
education on the other hand is not significant when it comes to explaining the choice of
work related training but it is significant when explaining educational training. These
                                                          
17 Think of the non-monetary costs of training in terms of ‘disutility units’, for instance disutility per hour,
day or month.20
results support the assumption made above that there are differences in disutility of
effort between the two types of training programs. For clients that are relatively highly
educated, the (marginal) non-monetary costs or disutility of educational training is lower
for every time or effort ‘unit’ compared to work related training and vice versa for
clients with secondary education or less.
Next, we turn to the variables explaining the monetary opportunity costs of training,
INCOME, SPOUSEINC and VRBEN.
In section 3, we argued that being a recipient of VR benefits decreases the monetary
opportunity costs of training and thereby increases the probability of taking part in
active training. That prediction is confirmed in Table 3. Receiving VR benefits reduces
the probability of non-participation. It is interesting to note that VR benefits also
decrease the probability of taking part in work related training while increasing the
probability of educational training. Adding that the size of spouse income significantly
influences the probability of educational training, while having a non-significant effect
on the probabilities of non-participation and work related training, gives strength to the
arguments that (i) non-participants are different from participants and (ii) that
participants in educational training differ from participants in work related training. The
differences are most naturally interpreted as differences in NMC and MOC, as predicted
in section 3.
Former level of income does not seem to have any significant effect on non-
participation but the higher the former income is, the less likely it is that a client chooses
work related training, while it increases the probability of participation in educational
training. People who invest in human capital have foregone earnings since they take
training and do not work. Unemployed people (not on training) also have foregone
earnings since they also are out of the labour market. However, if they are not able to get
a job at all, foregone earnings is zero since foregone earnings is a combination of wages
and the probability of getting that wage. An insignificant coefficient on previous income
for persons not in training indicates that foregone earnings is close to zero because they21
cannot get a job. The negative sign on work related training is in accordance with the
theoretical prediction in equation (9). We expect that higher previous income would
reduce the probability of training, since people with the potential of earning a high
income would be more eager to get back into work without training. However, it might
be the case that training is necessary to maintain a high income, and that without such
training the individuals would experience a drop in income. If this were the case we
would expect a positive sign if the drop in income is large enough. This might be the
case for persons in educational training, since the estimated coefficient is positive for
this group.
Other explanatory variables also entered the regressions, and Table 3 shows that being
male decreases the probability of non-participation. For those that participate, being
male increases the probability of work related training while decreases the probability of
education training. Turning the results around: women are more likely to choose
educational training or non-participation and less likely to participate in work related
training.
Being married significantly increases the probability of not participating in any program.
The same is true for clients having status as (partly) disabled. As the number of years of
work experience increases, the more likely it is that clients opt for non-participation.
Being employed the year before registering as VR client has the opposite effect in the
sense that it increases the probability of entering work related training. Recipients of
social benefits have lower probability of taking part in educational training, while
having children under 18 years of age increases the probability of taking part in
educational training.
The dummy variables representing broad groups of diagnosis also have significant
impact on some of choices made by VR clients (compared to the base category
Diagnosis 0). The dummy variables for diagnosis are unordered.22
Finally, Table 3 shows that VR enrolment in 1993 significantly reduces the probability
of non-participation while increasing the probability of participation.
We have tested
18 both whether the vector of all the coefficients in each state are
significantly different between states, and whether single coefficients are different
across states. We find that the vector of coefficients is significantly different overall, i.e.
the explanatory variables generally have different effects on the probability of entering
the different states. Furthermore, most of the single coefficient comparisons show the
same. The important non-significant test results are the AGE coefficient; the dummy
variables SOCBEN and VRBEN, which have non-significant differences when
comparing non-participation and work related training. Comparing the EXPER variable,
we find that there is no significant difference between work related and educational
training. Likewise, SPOUSEINC is significantly different only between work related
and educational training, while JOB_1 is significantly different between non-
participation and work related training only.
To sum up, we find that our results support the view that participants in educational
training differ from the participants in the other two groups. Interpreting the choice
made by non-participants is not self-evident but we find, as hypothesised, that non-
participants single themselves out compared to the active clients.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have estimated factors affecting the probabilities of entering training using a
relatively large set of background characteristics of the individuals as explanatory
variables. In the theoretical discussion sub-sets of these variables are linked to the two
main cost components facing VR clients: non-monetary costs of training and the
monetary opportunity costs of training. Participants in educational programs have both
lower non-monetary costs of training and lower monetary costs of training compared to
participant in work related training. Non-participants as a group are ‘poor’ in terms of
                                                          
18 The test results are not reported in tables. Results are available from the authors upon request.23
decisive background characteristics. We have argued that being ‘poor’ increases the
costs of training and lessens incentives to invest in human capital.
Our results partly fit an investment-signalling dichotomy.
19 Participants in educational
training have background characteristics that indicate comparatively low disutility of
training as we define it. We also find that the monetary opportunity costs of training is
comparatively low for this group of clients making signalling an even more attractive
option. A narrow interpretation of signalling theory is that we should expect to find that
clients with relatively high educational levels dominate among participants in
educational training and that active clients separate themselves into the two different
programs depending on factors such as former educational level and age. Another
interpretation is that while participation in educational training can be interpreted as a
signalling decision, participation in work related training is the same as screening.
Participants in work related training do differ from the other groups of clients in terms
of relevant background characteristics and although signalling theory does not rule our
pooling of types, clients taking active part in training seem to take separate actions.
Thus, participating in work related training could be interpreted as an investment
decision rather than a signalling decision since the client reveals private information
through his/her conduct at work. This may be a debatable conclusion. A different
interpretation is that clients in practice have to choose between a signalling mechanism
(participation in educational training) or a screening mechanism (participation in work
related training) dismissing the pure investment argument altogether. Even non-
participation could be termed a signal, perhaps the strongest negative signal of ability
seen from prospective employers’ point of view.
From a governmental perspective the main aim of active training is that clients should
invest in human capital and productive skills so that, in turn, transition to disability
pension is reduced. As we have tried to show, an individual client may find it more
                                                          
19 See for instance Cohn, Kiker and Mendes De Oliveira (1987), Hungerford and Solon (1987), Belman
and Heywood (1997) and Kroch and Sjoblom (1999) for empirical tests of education as human capital or
signal. Based on these studies, signalling theory seems to lack decisive empirical support.24
rational to either stay out of training altogether or seek to separate themselves from
other clients by choosing different types of training. From a policy perspective the
underlying reasons that may guide an individual’s decision to choose educational
training versus work related could be of only minor interest as long as some kind of
investment is made. On the other hand, using work related training and educational
training as a sorting mechanism can be useful if clients opting for a disability pension
stay out of active training anyhow and leave the VR resources available to clients with
aspirations of entering the labour market again. We find results pointing in this direction
since disability status significantly increases the probability of non-participation in
active training.25
Appendix
Table 1. Variables used in multinomial logit regression
Variable name Definitions
EDU Educational training, dummy variable.
WRT Work related training, dummy variable.
NPRG Non-participation, dummy variable.
AGE Age, in years.
MALE Dummy variable (1=male, 0=female).
HIGHSCH Clients with at least high school education prior to VR, Dummy
variable.
COLLEGE Clients with at least college/university education prior to VR,
Dummy variable.
CHILD18 Clients with children less then 18 years of age, Dummy variable.
MARRIED Dummy variable (1=married, 0=not married)
SOCBEN Dummy variable indicating if the person is receiving social benefit
having the value one if the person is or has received benefits in the
year prior to entering the vocational rehabilitation sector, and zero
otherwise.
DISABIL Disability pension is a dummy variable having the value one if the
person is disabled (received disability pension) in the year prior to
entering the vocational rehabilitation sector, and zero otherwise.
The disability is less then 100 percent.
VRBEN Dummy variable indicating if the person is receiving VR benefits.
INCOME Income and spouse's income are measured in 100,000 Kroner
(NOK). Income is measured for the year before the application and
is given in 1989-kroners.
EXPER Number of years of working experience prior to VR.
SPOUSEINC See INCOME
JOB_1 Dummy variable having the value one if the individual is employed
in the previous period, and zero otherwise. A person is employed if
she has an employment spell of at least 90 days in the particular
year.
DIAGN0 – DIAGN5 Medical Diagnoses (0-5) are unordered dummy variables. Medical
diagnosis 0 is used as the base category in the regressions. More
information on these dummy variables is available upon request
from the authors.
YEAR89 – YEAR93 Year of entering VR (89-93) are dummy variables. Year89 is used
as the base category in the regressions.26
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum Cases
EDUCATIONAL TRAINING
AGE 31.7596 9.0649 16.0000 64.0000 1065
MALE .4836 .5000 .0000 1.0000 1065
HIGHSCH .7042 .4566 .0000 1.0000 1065
COLLEGE .1052 .3069 .0000 1.0000 1065
CHILD18 .3718 .4835 .0000 1.0000 1065
MARRIED .3587 .4798 .0000 1.0000 1065
SOCBEN .1831 .3869 .0000 1.0000 1065
DISABIL .0779 .2682 .0000 1.0000 1065
VRBEN .5897 .4921 .0000 1.0000 1065
INCOME .9372 .7790 .0000 4.4690 1065
EXPER 8.9483 6.8366 .0000 26.0000 1065
SPOUSEINC .6678 1.0788 .0000 10.9000 1065
JOB_1 .5418 .4985 .0000 1.0000 1065
DIAGN0 .2056 .4044 .0000 1.0000 1065
DIAGN1 .3793 .4855 .0000 1.0000 1065
DIAGN2 .1587 .3656 .0000 1.0000 1065
DIAGN4 .0620 .2412 .0000 1.0000 1065
DIAGN5 .0516 .2214 .0000 1.0000 1065
DIAGN6 .1427 .3500 .0000 1.0000 1065
YEAR89 .2272 .4192 .0000 1.0000 1065
YEAR90 .1972 .3981 .0000 1.0000 1065
YEAR91 .2188 .4136 .0000 1.0000 1065
YEAR92 .1634 .3699 .0000 1.0000 1065
YEAR93 .1934 .3952 .0000 1.0000 1065
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WORK RELATED TRAINING
AGE 35.4026 11.4586 15.0000 69.0000 3927
MALE .6114 .4875 .0000 1.0000 3927
HIGHSCH .5944 .4911 .0000 1.0000 3927
COLLEGE .0530 .2240 .0000 1.0000 3927
CHILD18 .2832 .4506 .0000 1.0000 3927
MARRIED .3491 .4768 .0000 1.0000 3927
SOCBEN .3107 .4628 .0000 1.0000 3927
DISABIL .1757 .3806 .0000 1.0000 3927
VRBEN .4270 .4947 .0000 1.0000 3927
INCOME .7765 .7482 .0000 4.3810 3927
EXPER 10.3305 8.2056 .0000 26.0000 3927
SPOUSEINC .5477 .9099 .0000 10.5000 3927
JOB_1 .4856 .4999 .0000 1.0000 3927
DIAGN0 .2223 .4159 .0000 1.0000 3927
DIAGN1 .3020 .4592 .0000 1.0000 3927
DIAGN2 .3079 .4617 .0000 1.0000 3927
DIAGN4 .0532 .2245 .0000 1.0000 3927
DIAGN5 .0354 .1848 .0000 1.0000 3927
DIAGN6 .0792 .2701 .0000 1.0000 3927
YEAR89 .2401 .4272 .0000 1.0000 3927
YEAR90 .2175 .4126 .0000 1.0000 3927
YEAR91 .1956 .3967 .0000 1.0000 3927
YEAR92 .1693 .3751 .0000 1.0000 3927
YEAR93 .1775 .3821 .0000 1.0000 392727
NON-PARTICIPANTS
AGE 38.5966 11.4593 16.0000 67.0000 1661
MALE .5370 .4988 .0000 1.0000 1661
HIGHSCH .5352 .4989 .0000 1.0000 1661
COLLEGE .0686 .2529 .0000 1.0000 1661
CHILD18 .3372 .4729 .0000 1.0000 1661
MARRIED .4654 .4990 .0000 1.0000 1661
SOCBEN .2444 .4299 .0000 1.0000 1661
DISABIL .3113 .4632 .0000 1.0000 1661
VRBEN .5099 .5001 .0000 1.0000 1661
INCOME .8565 .7485 .0000 4.1110 1661
EXPER 12.0692 7.8085 .0000 26.0000 1661
SPOUSEINC .7296 1.0274 .0000 10.2000 1661
JOB_1 .4967 .5001 .0000 1.0000 1661
DIAGN0 .1559 .3629 .0000 1.0000 1661
DIAGN1 .4257 .4946 .0000 1.0000 1661
DIAGN2 .2185 .4134 .0000 1.0000 1661
DIAGN4 .0518 .2216 .0000 1.0000 1661
DIAGN5 .0476 .2129 .0000 1.0000 1661
DIAGN6 .1005 .3008 .0000 1.0000 1661
YEAR89 .2487 .4324 .0000 1.0000 1661
YEAR90 .2571 .4372 .0000 1.0000 1661
YEAR91 .2179 .4130 .0000 1.0000 1661
YEAR92 .1987 .3991 .0000 1.0000 1661
YEAR93 .0777 .2677 .0000 1.0000 166128
Table 3. Marginal effects. Multinomial Logit Model
Variables Non-Participation Work related Educational
Constant -.2391* .2267* .0124
(.0314) (.0351) (.0236)
AGE .0020** .0038* -.0059*
(.0008) (.0009) (.0007)
HIGHSCH -.0435* -.0190 .0625*
(.0117) (.0133) (.0095)
COLLEGE -.0070 -.1150* .1220*
(.0234) (.0262) (.0155)
INCOME .0065 -.0483* .0417*
(.0098) (.0109) (.0068)
SPOUSEINC .0017 -.0111 .0094**
(.0072) (.0080) (.0049)
VRBEN -.0264** -.0595* .0859*
(.0118) (.0129) (.0082)
MALE -.0414* .0855* -.0441*
(.0133) (.0146) (.0092)
MARRIED .0359** -.0194 -.0165
(.0156) (.0176) (.0118)
DISABIL .1423* -.0394** -.1029*
(.0138) (.0170) (.0135)
EXPER .0030** -.0022 -.0008
(.0012) (.0014) (.0010)
JOB_1 -.0275**   .0375* .0100
(.0128) (.0142) (.0091)
SOCBEN .0198 .0227 -.0425*
(.0142) (.0156) (.0105)
CHILD18 -.0126 -.0110 .0236**
(.0135) (.0152) (.0100)
DIAGN1 .0919* -.0893* -.0026
(.0164) (.0177) (.0111)
DIAGN2 .0179 .0405** -.0584*
(.0176) (.0189) (.0126)
DIAGN4 .0549** -.0375 -.0175
(.0272) (.0293) (.0181)
DIAGN5 .0739** -.1217* .0478**
(.0292) (.0323) (.0198)
DIAGN6 .0869* -.1182* .0312**
(.0220) (.0239) (.0140)
YEAR90 .0325** -.0221 -.0104
(.0155) (.0176) (.0118)
YEAR91 .0108 -.0112 .0004
(.0161) (.0181) (.0117)
YEAR92 .0128 -.0030 -.0098
(.0169) (.0191) (.0127)
YEAR93 -.1731* .1290* .0440**
(.0209) (.0215) (.0125)
N= 6653
2 χ = 1135.04
DF = 44
* Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%.29
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